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Abstract. The study analyses the micro-level determinants of voting turnout rates in Greece. In particular, we test for 
the effects of citizens’ socio-economic features, political participation, activism and trust as pointing to either an 
expressive or instrumental voting decision process. The analysis involves bootstrap logistic regression techniques and 
ESS data covering the 2002-2011 period. Evidence is found of instrumental voting in Greece as suggested by the 
effects of absolute and relative income and the effect of civic participation and trust variables. In addition, the profile of 
voters is differentiated in the pre- and during the crisis periods. The study makes a twofold contribution. First, the 
suggested analysis is unique for Greece, and thus it provides important information regarding citizens’ motives towards 
electoral participation. The second contribution relates to the study’s relevance to policy analysis and design. Results 
suggest that not only ideology but also the economic agenda might be an important predictor of electoral participation 
and consequently, legitimization and the quality of democracy in Greece. 
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1. Introduction 
Voting is perhaps the single most important evidence of the legitimacy pertaining to a 
democratic regime. As an essential element of participation, voting turnout constitutes the sine 
qua non of democratic elections and a means for people to legally take part in collective 
decision making processes and change their governing officials (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1982; 
Lijphart 1999; Schmitter and Karl, 1991). In that sense, political democracy is about regulating 
the political power held by elites in contrast to non-elites (Bollen, 1980), i.e. it is a synthesis of 
political freedom and political equality (Munck, 2016). The quality of democracy is subject to the 
existing nexus between the political system of a society and other characteristics, e.g. the 
modernization process, social justice and a market–based economic system (Lipset, 1959). 
These characteristics are actually societal choices and phenomena with multifaceted causes 
and consequences (Bollen, 1990; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). Furthermore, they account for 
the difference between democracy and democratic standards, i.e. the difference between the 
formal rule of law and socio-political and economic outcomes (Lipset, 1959; Hewitt, 1977; Dahl, 
1984; Gastil, 1987; Munck, 2016). 
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Participation in that sense is a critical element of democracy as operationalized in practice, 
since it practically safeguards political freedom and political equality from turning into mere 
formalities (Munck, 2016). When the majority of citizens have the power to change the status 
quo, then democracy carries the most desirable properties of stability, legitimacy and 
effectiveness (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1982; Lijphart 1999; Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Munck, 2016). 
These properties contribute to socio-economic welfare as different individual preferences are 
matched via elections (Lipset, 1959; Schmitter and Karl, 1991). Given that electoral participation 
may fluctuate alongside national contexts (e.g. compulsory voting, political system), types of 
elections, and time, important insights might be provided via country-level evidence regarding 
the individuals’ decision to participate in national elections. 
From the early 1980s onwards, voting abstention rates in Greece constantly increase at a 
slow, albeit standard, rate. This fact indicates the presence of a possibly persistent trend that 
merits deeper analysis. Political rights and political liberties in Greece are sufficient to 
characterize the country as a fair and stable political democracy (Danopoulos, 2017). 
Nevertheless, political accountability in the country is weak, in all its aspects (vertical, horizontal, 
and social) a fact that hampers the quality of democracy (Danopoulos, 2015). Increasing 
abstention rates point to a legitimization crisis that most probably relates to the wider civic 
culture qualities of the Greek society (Daskalopoulou, 2018a). The analysis of the various 
political, social and economic factors as predictors of voting turnout might offer important 
insights to the topic. To that extent, we analyze the effect of civic culture features on the 
probability of voting turnout in Greece. In particular, the present study has a twofold aim. First, 
we are interested in sketching the profile of voters (compared to non-voters) in order to identify 
the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of people who are more likely to 
participate in this crucial democratic legitimization process. The second aim relates to identifying 
the possible effect that formal and latent political participation forms, activism and trust might 
exercise upon an individual’s decision to participate in national elections in Greece. Taken 
together these voting determinants will allow us to differentiate between expressive participation 
(acts motivated by sense of identity and obligation to neighbors or community, for example) and 
instrumental participation (acts motivated by the functional and political concerns of people such 
as protect personal investments and promote local businesses, for example) (Dahl, 1984; Talo 
and Mannarini, 2015) as the underlying motive of voting turnout in Greece. 
As regards the study’s contribution, two points need to be made. First, the suggested 
analysis is unique for Greece as no previous study has been performed in this area and will 
thus provide us with important information regarding people’s motives towards electoral 
participation. The second contribution relates to the study’s relevance for policy analysis and 
design. During the past decades, Greece has made important achievements with regard to its 
integration in the European Union (EU) regulation framework and procedures. Nevertheless, the 
country’s socio-economic and institutional basis has proven unable to handle the impact of the 
financial crisis while the governmental authorities and political organizations have largely failed 
to gain widespread support for the necessary structural changes that might ensure Greece’s 
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sustainable socio-economic development (Bitros, 2013; Bitros and Karayiannis, 2013). The 
decade of crisis was thus a period of profound asymmetry between individuals’ motives and 
policy-makers’ objectives. A clearer understanding of the motives underlying political 
participation procedures and the content of consent attributed to voting is crucial as for the 
country to be able to build stronger institutions that will help her address future challenges 
(Baltas, 2013; Bitros, 2015). Here we assume that knowledge on the potentially expressive or 
instrumental voting character of features such as economic status, formal and informal 
participation, activism and trust might enhance our understanding of how to build social 
consensus via actively supporting the key societal decision-making mechanisms of voting 
participation. The empirical analysis is based on ESS data referring to the 2002-2011 period for 
Greece. Analysis differentiates between the pre-crisis (2002-2008) and the crisis period (2011) 
and yields important evidence with regard to the profile of voters and the instrumental nature of 
their electoral participation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Part 2 is devoted to a brief presentation of the 
study’s theoretical context. Part 3 presents the model and data. Part 4 presents the results and 
Part 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the study’s findings. 
 
2. Theoretical context: the democracy-participation relationship  
Political democracy is a synthesis between political freedom and political equality rules that are 
set forth in order to facilitate collective decision making in the presence of different preferences 
(Lipset, 1959; Munck, 2016). It is a political system ‘… which supplies regular constitutional 
opportunities for changing the governing officials’ (Lipset, 1959: 71), and regulates the 
difference in political power held by elites and non-elites (Bollen, 1980). Furthermore, 
constitutional democracy carries stability, legitimacy and effectiveness because it is the vehicle 
for achieving the wider socio-economic goals of society (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1982; Lijphart 1999; 
Schmitter and Karl, 1991). To that extent, political democracy is inexorably linked to social and 
economic goals, but it is not identical to social democracy and/or economic democracy (Lipset, 
1959; Hewitt, 1977; Dahl, 1982; Gastil, 1987). Socio-economic concerns often enter the 
discussion regarding the quality of a democracy. This relates directly to the nexus between the 
political system and other societal choices such as the modernization process of societies, 
social justice and a market–based economic system (Bollen, 1990; Munck and Verkuilen, 
(2002). 
According to Schmitter and Karl (1991: 83), we might identify political democracy through the 
presence of key democratic institutions such as: a) consensus, i.e. people’s degree of 
agreement with substantive political actions and the role of the state, b) participation, i.e. rules 
supporting active and equal participation in politics should one wishes to, c) access, i.e. equal 
opportunities of groups to express their preferences, d) responsiveness, i.e. rulers must be held 
accountable for their actions through regular and fair processes, and e) parliamentary 
sovereignty, i.e. the legislature must not be the only body that makes rules or even be the only 
Irene Daskalopoulou / European Journal of Government and Economics 9(1), June 2020, 26-45 
29 
 
body with the final authority to decide which laws are binding. These democratic institutions 
appear through an immense variety of empirical manifestations (Munck, 2016). The crucial role 
of the social environment of politics is clearly evidenced in the cross-national differences in 
democracy. We might categorize the origins of these differences into four wide areas. The first 
one relates to cross-national differences in the political system and the legitimacy of a country’s 
institutions (e.g. confidence in a country’s government and parliament) (Klingemann, 1999; Karp 
et al., 2003; Aarts and Thomassen, 2008; Ariely, 2015). The second one relates to the type and 
stock of social capital and in particular trust and solidarity as key societal features (Fukuyama, 
2001; 2014; Putnam, 1995; Newton, 1997; Marozzi, 2015). The third area of differences among 
countries relates to the role of mass media and their interaction with society (Newton, 1997; 
Fukuyama, 2014; Ceron and Memoli, 2016). Finally, the fourth area relates to differences in 
what is known as abstract types of civic participation and engagement, or else disengagement, 
which is thought to be a genuine and active style of participation in modern economies (Ekman 
and Amnå, 2012; Talò and Mannarini, 2015). Thus, citizenship and the decision-making 
standards in a democracy evolve through societal characteristics such as mutual trust, fairness 
and the willingness to compromise, trust in institutions, civil organizations and social 
movements, and so on, or else, ‘civic culture’ (Dahl, 1984; Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Bollen, 
1990; Newton, 1997; Norris 2001; Fukuyama, 2001; Yamagishi, 2001). 
Given the democratic legitimization power of political participation, the developed countries 
view the increasingly declining turnout rates in their national (and supranational) electorates as 
an unexpected ‘paradox’ (Powell, 1986; Flickingerand Studlar, 1992). Cross country studies 
have come to analyze the phenomenon, and their evidence suggest that electoral participation 
is affected by the quality of institutions underlying a democratic regime, e.g. the role of mass 
media freedom and political representation, socio-demographic characteristics and political 
preferences, economic conditions and the political system (Matsusaka, 1995; Feddersen and 
Pesendorfer, 1996; Sobbrio and Navarra, 2010; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2012; Birch, 2018). 
Summarizing the common ground in the field, a number of studies suggest that voting turnout is 
influenced by a great number of factors which might be distinguished into three wide sets 
namely, the socio-economic environment, institutions, and party systems (Powell, 1986; Blais 
and Dobrzynska, 1998; Franklin, 2001; Grönlund and Setälä, 2007). 
While acknowledging these three sets of factors as crucial in determining turnout, their 
variation across national and supranational contexts suggests that we are still far from a 
thorough understanding of why people vote. At the theoretical level, macro approaches lack a 
plausible theory of human motivation that might be used to provide comprehensive explanations 
of electoral participation thus leading to a general aggregate level theory (Lane and Ersson, 
1990). Indeed, differences in institutional arrangements and cultural factors account for cross-
national variation in voter turnout rates (Jackman and Miller, 1995). Through a meta-analysis 
that assesses the empirical evidence of 83 aggregate-level studies, Geys (2006) argues that we 
indeed lack a ‘core’ model of voter turnout. On the other hand, micro level studies increasingly 
stress the need to analyze further the role of differences in political preferences, institutions and 
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the socio-economic environment in order to acquire more comprehensive knowledge of such 
phenomena as voting turnout. Indicative are the findings of Sobbrio and Navarra (2010) who 
stress that political preferences and education seem to play a significant role in the likelihood of 
‘communicating voting’ and this expression is different between left-wing and right-wing voters. 
Similarly, in their individual level study Grönlund and Setälä (2007), analyze institutional trust, 
and in particular trust in parliament, as a key determinant that increases the likelihood of voting. 
In the present study, we analyze voting turnout in Greece using individual level data that will 
allow us to determine the role of socio-demographic and economic conditions as well as the role 
of individual level preferences over institutions and the political system of the country. Available 
knowledge includes very few studies regarding the determinants of voting in Greece. At the 
macro level of analysis, indicative is the study of Alogoskoufis and Philippopoulos (1991) who 
extend the ‘rational partisan model’ to introduce the role of inflation and unemployment 
dynamics as voter determinants. More recently, the study of Nezi (2012) uses individual level 
data to test for the ‘grievance asymmetry’ hypothesis in relation to support for the incumbent 
party while Kosmidis (2013) analyses the link between voting intentions and the state of the 
economy during the crisis period. Other studies deal with the role of mass media in voting and 
voting intentions in Greece (Papagiannidis et al., 2012) and the role of subjective individual 
perceptions in economic voting (Freire and Costa Lobo, 2005). 
Here, we follow Dahl (1984) and Talo and Mannarini (2015) and we try to differentiate 
between expressive participation (acts motivated by sense of identity and obligation to 
neighbors, community etc.) and instrumental participation (acts motivated by the functional and 
political concerns of people such as protect personal investments and promote local businesses 
etc.) as determinants of voting turnout in the case of Greece. To do so we set a twofold aim that 
consists of: 1) sketching the socio-demographic and economic profile of voters (compared to 
non-voters) and, 2) identifying the possible effect that formal and latent political participation, 
activism and trust might exercise upon an individual’s decision to participate in elections in 
Greece. Taken together, these two sets of voting determinants will allow us to draw more 
informed conclusions regarding the individuals that are more likely to participate in such a 
crucial democratic legitimization process such as parliamentary elections. 
Assessing the quality of democracy in post-1974 Greece1, Danopoulos (2015; 2017) 
concludes that the country’s quality of democracy is fair, but is in need of improvement. 
Daskalopoulou (2018a) reports low individual level rates of satisfaction with democracy in 
Greece that depend largely upon the perceived quality of civil institutions in the country. With 
constantly decreasing voting turnout rates in Greece, concern has grown over key aspects of 
our democracy, namely legitimization and representation. Voting turnout in Greece is 
compulsory. This is a quite important characteristic of the Greek democracy since, in terms of 
political democracy, mandatory electoral participation is a fair institution, an equitable and 
effective coordination device to support for the provision of democracy as a public good (Birch, 
2018).  
                                                     
1 In 1974, democracy has been restored in the country after the collapse of the dictatorship that ruled the country from 
1967. 
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Figure 1. Voting abstention in parliamentary elections in Greece since 1974. Source: Own calculations based on 
Parliamentary elections data available at: 
https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/ 
 
 
To that extent, both political and socio-economic equality are to be expected as the outcomes of 
a democracy (Birch, 2018). Nevertheless, Greece’s aim of preserving electoral participation as 
compulsory is rather vague. 
The compulsory voting clause is practically invalid since penalties to non-voters were rarely 
applied ever since the enactment of compulsory voting in the country while, in 2001 the 
interpretive act allowing for the introduction of penalties to non-voters was withdrawn 
(Malkopoulou, 2014). To that extent, we might relate compulsory voting to citizens’ sense of 
duty towards the democratic regime, but the expected legitimization outcome of such a regime 
quality rule might not be fully realized. 
As Figure 1 shows, voting abstention in parliamentary elections in Greece has more than 
doubled in the last four decades, from 20.46% in 1974 to 43.43% in 2015. In the latest 
parliamentary elections held on July 2019, the abstention rate was again very high, reaching 
42.09%. These percentages might be somewhat overestimated due to old records cataloguing 
a bigger eligible to vote population. Nonetheless, the voting abstention trend is recorded as 
important and persistent. 
Within this context, we analyze the individual level motivation and mobilization determinants 
of voting turnout in Greece by means of testing the following hypotheses: 
 
H1. The socio-demographic and economic characteristics of respondents affect 
their voting turnout decision. 
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H2. Formal political participation will exercise a statistically significant and positive 
(negative) effect on the probability of voting. 
 
H3. Latent political participation will exercise a statistically significant and positive 
(negative) effect upon the probability of voting if it operates as complementary 
(substitute) to formal political participation. 
 
H4. Activism will exercise a statistically significant and positive (negative) effect 
upon the probability of voting if it operates as complementary (substitute) to formal 
political participation. 
 
H5. Trust will exercise a statistically significant and positive (negative) effect upon 
the probability of voting. 
 
 
The presence and the sign of the above-described effects are expected to provide us with 
important insights as regards the individuals’ expectations, perceptions, and the overall 
motivation and mobilization factors that underlie their decision to vote. H1 is considered the 
benchmark model that controls for the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of 
individuals which together with H2-H5 will provide us with important information about the profile 
of voters and the importance of economic or expressive considerations in this decision. 
 
3. Empirical model and data  
3.1. The model 
As explained in the previous part, the aim is to identify those factors that will enhance the 
probability that an individual participates in elections. Thus, a person’s decision to vote may be 
modelled as a binary (dichotomous) dependent variable of the form: 
 
𝑦𝑦 = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖 𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣0, 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝              ,   [1] 
 
where y is the dependent variable denoting voters and non-voters amongst those that are 
eligible to vote. In principle, any continuous probability distribution defined over the real line will 
suffice to obtain consistent predictions of the probability of the outcomes expressed in equation 
[1] (Greene, 1997). Either a normal distribution (probit model) or a logistic distribution (logit 
model) can be used to model the above outcomes. The two distributions are expected to give 
similar predictions unless the sample contains very few responses/non-responses (i.e. very few 
values of Y equal to 1 or Y equal to 0) and/or there is wide variation in an important independent 
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variable (Greene, 1997; Amemiya, 1981). In our case, there is a very large difference in the 
percentage of voters compared to that of non-voters (see Table 1) so we have chosen to use a 
logistic distribution. In that case we get a logit model of the form: 
 
     ( ) ( )
'
'
'Prob 1
1
x
x
ey x
e
b
b
b= = = Λ
+
,   [2] 
 
where ( ).Λ  indicates the logistic cumulative distribution function, x is a vector of explanatory 
variables, and b  is a set of corresponding parameters that reflect the impact of changes in x 
on the probability of y*. Bootstrap logistic regression has been performed in order to obtain 
robust estimations and account for the lower (compared to the estimated voting abstention rate 
during the period of analysis) percentage of non-voters in our sample. Our estimation 
procedures involve stratified resampling using 50,000 samples and 95% bias corrected and 
accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals (Efron and Tibshirani, 1986). The goodness of fit 
measures usually reported are the percent correctly predicted and various pseudo-R squared 
measures, the most often cited being the likelihood-ratio test statistic suggested by McFadden 
(1974). Here, we report the χ2 value of the omnibus test of the null hypothesis that the 
regression slopes for all predictors in the model are equal to zero, the log likelihood value (-2LL) 
which also tests for the significance of the explanatory variables model (full model) compared to 
the null model, two pseudo-R2 values2 that tell us approximately how much variation in the 
outcome is explained by the model and, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test of the goodness of fit, 
which is a Chi-square (χ2) test of whether or not the model is an adequate fit to the data3 (Pituch 
and Stevens, 2016). It should be noted though that goodness-of-fit measures in the case of 
binary response models is not as important as statistical and economic significance of the 
explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2002; Estrella, 1998). A final note refers to the interpretation 
of the logit model coefficients. The estimatedb ’s indicate the amount of increase (or decrease, 
if the sign of the coefficient is negative) in the predicted log odds of Y = 1 that would be 
predicted by a 1 unit increase (or decrease) in the predictor, holding all other predictors 
constant. Thus, in the case of the logit model the slope coefficient B is interpreted as the rate of 
change in the "log odds" of the dependent variable (Y) as an independent variable (X) changes. 
Because this explanation is not very intuitive, it is accustomed to compute the more intuitive 
expB, which is the effect of the independent variable on the odds ratio4. 
 
 
                                                     
2 The versions are the Cox & Snell and the Nagelkerke tests which are again used as approximations since they vary 
significantly depending on sample size and specification (Cox and Snell, 1989; Nagelkerke, 1991). 
3 The null hypothesis is that the model is a ‘good enough’ fit to the data (p=>.05) and we will only reject this null 
hypothesis, i.e. the model is a ‘poor’ fit, if p<.05. The test is subject to sample size and the inclusion of interactions in the 
data so again it should be considered as an approximation (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2013). 
4 The odds ratio is the probability of the event divided by the probability of the nonevent. For example, if expB1 =2, then 
a one unit change in the independent variable X1 would make the event twice as likely (.67/.33) to occur. For more 
details see: UCLA, SCG. Available at: https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/sas/modules/sas-learning-moduleintroduction-to-the-
features-of-sas/.   
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3.2. Data and variables 
The sample consists of a total number of 9,740 observations obtained from the four ESS waves 
that are available for Greece (Waves 1-2002, 2-2006, 4-2008 and 5-2011). A usable sample of 
9,135 observations consisting of the respondents that are eligible to vote, has been selected. 
Voters represent 81.6% of the sample (7,863 obs.) and non-voters represent 13.9% of the 
sample (1,272 obs.) (Table 1). 
Our dependent variable is a binary one taking the value of 1 if the respondent has voted in 
the last national elections and 0 if he/she hasn’t. The independent variables have been divided 
into five sets of factors referring to: 1st) the socio-economic and demographic profile of the 
respondents (lnAge, lnEducation, Gender, Household size, Children, Lives with 
husband/wife/partner at household grid, Household Income, Income satisfaction), 2nd) their 
pattern of formal political participation (Worked in political party or action group last 12 months, 
Member of political party, Contacted politician or government official last 12 months), 3rd) their 
pattern of latent political participation (Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties, How 
interested in politics, TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday, Placement 
on left to right scale), 4th) their pattern of activism (Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker 
last 12 months, Signed petition last 12 months, Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 
months, Boycotted certain products last 12 months, Worked in another organization or 
association last 12 months), 5th) the individuals’ level of generalized and institutional trust (Most 
people can be trusted or you can't be too careful, Trust in country's parliament, Trust in the legal 
system, Trust in the police, Trust in the European Parliament, Trust in the United Nations). 
Finally, wave dummies have been used to test for the presence of time structural breaks in our 
model. Table 2 presents the definition and measurement of variables as well as basic 
descriptive statistics for the whole sample and the voters and the non-voters sub-samples.  
 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of voters and non-voters in the sample. 
 Wave 1 Wave  2 Wave 4 Wave 5 Total 
Voters  2,139 2,050 1,692 1,982 7,863 
Non-voters  248 229 252 543 1,272 
Not eligible to vote 167 126 125 187 605 
Total  2,554 2,405 2,069 2,712 9,740 
Total usable sample  2,387 2,279 1,944 2,525 9,135 
 
Source: Own calculations using ESS data for Greece.  
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Table 2. Definition, measurement and basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample and the voters / non-voters sub-
samples. 
  
Variable definition and measurement  
Basic descriptive statistics 
All Voters Non-Voters 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Socio-demographic and economic 
characteristics        
Age, lnAge of respondent, calculated (13-98) 48.20 18.63 50.57 17.48 43.17 20.70 
Education, lnYears of full-time education 
completed (0-28) 10.56 4.49 10.44 4.63 11.06 4.21 
Gender (dummy, 1=male) .44 .50 .44 .50 .42 .49 
Children (dummy, 1=Yes)  .41 .49 .43 .50 .30 .46 
Household Size, lnNumber of people living 
regularly at the household  
2.69 1.31 2.71 1.30 2.55 1.34 
Married (dummy, 1=Lives with 
husband/wife/partner at household grid) .60 .49 .65 .48 .42 .49 
Household Income, in twelve income categories 
(1-12) 4.82 2.21 4.89 2.21 4.50 2.21 
Income satifaction,  (0-3, 3 = living comfortably 
on present income) 1.35 .89 1.37 .89 1.26 .88 
Formal political participation       
Worked in political party or action group last 12 
months (dummy, 1=Yes) .04 .21 .05 .22 .02 .12 
Member of political party (dummy, 1=Yes) .06 .24 .07 .25 .01 .12 
Contacted politician or government official last 
12 months (dummy, 1=Yes) .12 .32 .13 .34 .04 .20 
Latent political participation       
Feel closer to a particular party than all other 
parties (dummy, 1=Yes) .51 .41 .58 .49 .23 .42 
How interested in politics (0-3, 0 = not at all 
interested) 1.05 .95 1.12 .95 .78 .90 
TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on 
average weekday (0-7, 0 = no time at all) 1.81 1.47 1.90 1.47 1.47 1.43 
Placement on left to right scale (0-10, 10 = 
right) 5.42 2.17 5.47 2.18 5.02 2.05 
Activism       
Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 
12 months (dummy, 1=Yes) .03 .17 .03 .17 .02 .13 
Signed petition last 12 months dummy, 1=Yes) .04 .21 .05 .21 .03 .17 
Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 
12 months (dummy, 1=Yes) .06 .25 .07 .25 .05 .23 
Boycotted certain products last 12 months 
(dummy, 1=Yes) .10 .30 .10 .31 .10 .31 
Worked in another organisation or association 
last 12 months (dummy, 1=Yes) .05 .22 .05 .23 .02 .15 
Generalized and institutional trust        
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too 
careful (0-10, 10 = complete trust) 3.87 2.40 3.81 2.40 4.05 2.39 
Trust in country's parliament (0-10, 10 = 
complete trust) 3.74 2.74 3.82 2.74 3.01 2.64 
Trust in the legal system (0-10, 10 = complete 
trust) 5.07 2.90 5.10 2.88 4.55 2.92 
Trust in the police (0-10, 10 = complete trust) 5.51 2.87 5.61 2.84 4.84 2.97 
Trust in the European Parliament (0-10, 10 = 
complete trust) 4.43 2.82 4.48 2.80 3.71 2.78 
Trust in the United Nations (0-10, 10 = 
complete trust) 3.74 2.79 3.72 2.76 3.36 2.70 
 
Source: Own calculations using ESS data for Greece.  
 
4. Results 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the estimated models. Our benchmark model (M1) is 
the model including only the socio-economic and demographic and the time variables (control 
variables model). M1 is improved with the inclusion of the proposed participation and trust 
variables, and thus the full model (M2) is preferred.  
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Model 2 referring to the whole period under study presents a very satisfactory fit to the data 
and can thus be used as a reference point in the analysis of the predictors of voting turnout in 
Greece (Table 4). However, since there is a structural break in the model, evidenced by the 
statistically significant sign of the 2011 wave dummy, we have split the sample into the pre and 
the crisis periods and estimated models 3 and 4, respectively. After robust estimation 
procedures were applied the structural break in our model is estimated as negative suggesting 
that the probability of voting decreased in the crisis period (Table 4). Other important changes in 
the estimated coefficients refer to the effect of education and the income variables (Table 4).  
Comparing the results of models 3 and 4 (Table 5), we see that the socio-economic and 
demographic profile of voters in the two periods is different (H1 is confirmed). In the pre-crisis 
period, the probability of voting turnout increases with age, children and income. In contrast, 
during the crisis, the probability of voting turnout increases with age, marriage and household 
size. As regards the economic condition of respondents, it is important that income satisfaction 
is a positive voting predictor while income levels turn to a negative predictor. The difference in 
the profile of voters in the two periods is important evidence. In the pre-crisis period voters are 
older, higher income people with children in their family. In the crisis period, we see that voting 
turnout is more likely to occur for older, married people with larger household size who are 
satisfied with their relative income position but unsatisfied with their absolute income level.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Model statistics. 
 
Model summary  M1 M2 M3 M4 
N 9,135 9,135 6,610 2,525 
X2 (p) 388.581 
(p<.001) 
357.609 
(p<.001) 
232.778 
(p<.001) 
119.190 
(p<.001) 
-2LL 4,376.094 2,566.537 1,615.719 916.336 
Cox & Snell R2 .062 .078 .070 .093 
Nagelkerke R2 .114 .160 .160 .163 
Hosmer & Lemeshow χ2Test (p) 9.029 
(p=.340) 
6.031 
(p=.644) 
6.577 
(p=.583) 
7.590 
(p=.475) 
Classificationa       
Overall percentage correct  85.7 89.4 91.3 84.9 
Sensitivity 97.4 98.4 98.8 96.2 
aClassification cutoff point 0.65. 
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Table 4. Bootstrap logistic regression estimates: benchmark model and full model. 
 Benchmark model (M1) Full model (M2) 
 B 
Wald
2χ  p Exp(B) B 
Wald
2χ  p Exp(B) 
Constant -4.089 44.800 .000 .017 2.710 3.282 .070 15.033 
Socio-demographic & economic controls  
Age  1.260 103.744 .000 3.524 .935 29.372 .000 2.547 
Education .270 8.226 .004 1.310 .222 2.523 .112 1.249 
Gender .073 .798 .372 1.076 .073 .446 .504 1.076 
Married   .461 21.370 .000 1.586 .327 6.035 .014 1.387 
Household Size .374 11.862 .001 1.454 .281 3.831 .050 1.324 
Children .066 .340 .560 1.069 .254 2.778 .096 1.289 
Income satisfaction  .165 10.391 .001 1.180 .107 2.309 .129 1.113 
Household Income .000 .000 .997 1.000 .005 .031 .861 1.005 
wave 1 2002 .086 .446 .504 1.089 .027 .026 .871 1.028 
wave 2 2006 .066 .252 .616 1.068 .175 .989 .320 1.191 
wave 5 2010 -.777 45.567 .000 .460 -.348 4.832 .028 .706 
Formal political participation  
Member political party     -.551 2.287 .130 .576 
Contacted politician / official     -.405 3.415 .065 .667 
Worked political party      .017 .002 .966 1.017 
Latent political participation  
TV watching, news / politics / current affairs      -.003 .007 .935 .997 
Closer to particular party      -1.031 76.478 .000 .357 
 Interest in politics      -.170 6.498 .011 .844 
Left - right placement      .074 7.070 .008 1.077 
Activism          
Worked organization /  association     -.229 .458 .499 .795 
Campaign badge / sticker     -.324 .456 .500 .723 
Signed petition     -.483 2.001 .157 .617 
Public demonstration     -.295 1.621 .203 .745 
Boycotted products     .515 9.005 .003 1.674 
Trust          
Generalized trust     .006 .054 .816 1.006 
Country's Parliament      .024 .676 .411 1.024 
Legal system     -.075 6.452 .011 .928 
Police      .049 3.338 .068 1.050 
European Parliament     .046 1.685 .194 1.048 
United Nations     -.067 4.632 .031 .935 
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Table 5. Bootstrap logistic regression estimates: full model for the pre- and during the crisis periods. 
 
 
 Full model: pre-crisis (M3) Full model: crisis (M4) 
 B 
Wald
2χ  p Exp(B) B 
Wald
2χ  p Exp(B) 
Constant .402 .048 .827 1.495 7.636 5.227 .022 2071.747 
Socio-demographic & economic controls  
Age  1.152 27.135 .000 3.165 .642 5.048 .025 1.900 
Education .116 .396 .529 1.123 .369 2.617 .106 1.446 
Gender .165 1.379 .240 1.180 -.081 .199 .655 .922 
Married   .238 1.961 .161 1.269 .404 3.262 .071 1.497 
Household Size .263 2.183 .140 1.301 .450 3.000 .083 1.568 
Children .370 3.581 .058 1.448 .062 .058 .809 1.064 
Income satisfaction  -.022 .056 .814 .979 .329 8.127 .004 1.390 
Household Income .078 3.966 .046 1.081 -.095 4.137 .042 .910 
wave 1 2002 .014 .006 .937 1.014     
wave 2 2006 .155 .730 .393 1.168     
Formal political participation  
Member political party -.445 1.105 .293 .641 -.873 1.330 .249 .418 
Contacted politician / official -.414 2.414 .120 .661 -.664 2.622 .105 .515 
Worked political party  .233 .275 .600 1.262 -.727 .437 .509 .483 
Latent political participation  
TV watching, news / politics / 
current affairs .003 .004 .952 1.003 .012 .032 .859 1.012 
Interest in politics -.201 5.053 .025 .818 -.133 1.640 .200 .876 
Closer to particular party -.945 42.842 .000 .389 -1.289 34.292 .000 .276 
Left - right placement  .085 5.625 .018 1.088 .064 1.971 .160 1.066 
Activism          
Worked organization /        
association -.168 .175 .676 .845 -.476 .518 .472 .621 
Campaign badge / sticker .126 .055 .815 1.134 -1.210 1.217 .270 .298 
Signed petition -1.093 4.672 .031 .335 .250 .257 .612 1.284 
Public demonstration .218 .474 .491 1.244 -.657 3.651 .056 .518 
Boycotted products .526 6.028 .014 1.693 .603 4.098 .043 1.828 
Trust          
Generalized trust .013 .192 .661 1.013 -.007 .027 .869 .993 
Country's Parliament  .026 .526 .468 1.027 .023 .196 .658 1.024 
Legal system -.066 2.922 .087 .936 -.078 2.753 .097 .925 
Police  .045 1.650 .199 1.046 .049 1.359 .244 1.051 
European Parliament .056 1.596 .207 1.057 .032 .243 .622 1.033 
United Nations -.090 5.731 .017 .914 -.046 .551 .458 .955 
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In the two periods, important changes are observed with regard to the effect of the social 
capital variables analyzed. Formal political participation exerts a statistically significant but 
negative effect on the probability of voting (H2 is confirmed). More specifically, formal political 
participation in the form of political contacts decreases the probability of voting. This effect, 
however, is not confirmed when the two periods are analyzed separately (H2 is not confirmed in 
M3, M4). Mixed results are presented in the case of latent political participation (H3 is 
confirmed). As shown, the probability of voting decreases for those respondents who feel closer 
to a particular party and show higher levels of interest in politics while it increases as placement 
on the left to right political scale increases. In the crisis period, feeling closer to a particular party 
is the only statistically significant voting predictor that again exerts a negative effect. Activism 
also presents mixed effects as a determinant of voting turnout (H4 is confirmed). In the pre-
crisis period, the probability of voting increases for respondents which have boycotted certain 
products and decreases for the respondents who have signed petitions. In the crisis period, 
voting turnout increases for respondents who have boycotted certain products and decreases 
for those who have participated in public demonstrations. Finally, as regards the effect of trust 
on the probability of voting turnout we see that generalized trust does not affect the decision to 
vote while institutional trust is a voting predictor (H5 is confirmed). It is important, however, that 
trust in the legal system is found a negative voting predictor, and this finding is observed in both 
periods. Trust in supranational institutions such as the UN is also a negative voting predictor but 
the effect of this variable is reported only in the pre-crisis period. It could be associated with 
Greek citizens’ increased awareness over the global role and interventions of such institutions, 
albeit it is a finding that merits further research in the future.  
Given ESS data availability, and bootstrap estimation, other variables that could be used as 
explanatory variables in the current context were also tested for their possible effect. In 
particular, we have tested for the possible sensitiveness of our results with regard to the 
respondents’: a) employment status and type of employment; b) political beliefs (trust in 
politicians, trust in political parties); c) use of other sources of information about politics 
(newspaper reading, politics/current affairs on average weekday, and/or radio listening, 
news/politics/current affairs on average weekday); and d) abstract forms of engagement 
(feelings about politics, e.g. politics too complicated to understand, difficulty in making mind up 
about political issues) (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2009; Ceron and Memoli, 2016; 
Daskalopoulou, 2018b; Talò and Mannarini, 2015; Ekman and Amnå, 2012). None of these 
variables has been found to exert a statistically significant effect on the probability of voting 
turnout. Excluding them from the estimated models did not affect their fit and the corresponding 
classification rates. It is possible that the effect of these variables is captured by the ones 
already included in the analysis. An additional possible explanation might relate to the high non-
response rate of some of these variables (e.g. the news variables, trust in politicians, trust in 
political parties). In any case however, their possible effect should be tested in future research 
studying voting turnout (and abstention) in the post-crisis era in the country. 
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5. Conclusion and discussion 
The present study aims at identifying the determinants of voting turnout in Greece using 
European Social Survey data for the 2002-2011 period and a binary dependent variable model. 
Five empirical hypotheses are formed and tested in the context of the study using bootstrap 
logistic regression techniques. Through the estimation of several models we test for the socio-
demographic and economic characteristics that affect the respondents’ voting turnout decision, 
and the effect of formal political participation, latent political participation, activism, and trust 
(generalized and institutional), on the probability a person decides to vote. The analysis controls 
for the structural break observed in the model after the onset of the economic crisis in the 
country and particularly after the enforcement of the first financial consolidation measures. 
Empirical results sketch two different profiles that are compatible with a backward turn, or 
perhaps a delay, in the democratic modernization process of Greece. More specifically, in the 
pre-crisis period, we see that the voters are people who value contemporary forms of civic 
engagement (latent political participation and activism) and tend to distrust formal institutions 
such as the legal system and supranational institutions. Taken together, these effects seem to 
suggest the presence of a political distrust trend (or a more apolitical stance). This trend 
involves older higher income respondents having children and who consider other forms of civic 
engagement, e.g. petitions, as a substitute to standard civil participation processes, and distrust 
public institutions (legal system) and supranational institutions like the UN. In the crisis period, 
the socio-demographic and economic profile of voters is different. Results show that age, 
marriage and household size are strong positive predictors of voting in that period. An 
interesting finding relates to the effect of the income variables. Voting turnout increases as 
income satisfaction increases and decreases with absolute income level. Thus, we might argue 
that there is a differentiated stance after the onset of the financial consolidation measures which 
has caused those satisfied with their income to increase their voting rates and those of higher 
absolute income to decrease their voting rates. 
Taken together, the evidence for the two periods support the argument that citizens vote in 
accordance with instrumental voting. People decide on the basis of income, while ‘traditional’ 
forms of formal engagement and political attachment seem to cause negative effects. Having in 
mind two crucial contextual factors, namely (1) the time of the analysis (bailout programs and 
fiscal measures, radical political changes) and (2) the no-penalties compulsory voting clause, 
evidence is provided that pecuniary interests are related to strongly motivated voters.  
The present findings are important also in terms of policy analysis in the field. The 
importance of economic considerations for voting participation clearly indicates that citizens’ 
support to state regime is interlinked with growth and prosperity prerequisites. This, in turn, 
adds complexity to an existing backward spiral that commenced with the onset of the financial 
crisis, and the measures employed to address it, and continuous to exacerbate in the presence 
of other socio-economic challenges and phenomena such as unemployment and exploitation in 
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the workplace, migration, rising crime and insecurity etc. (Pantazidou, 2013; Voulgarelli-
Christidou, 2016). Furthermore, the economic and democratic depression experienced in 
Greece (Bellucci et al., 2012) coincides with the citizens’ deeper knowledge and understanding 
of how country level decisions are transferred to European Union and taken therein in favor of 
an enlarged but not necessarily integrated EU community (Baltas, 2013; Bitros, 2015). To the 
extent that Greece has still important work to do in terms of implementing the measures agreed 
under its bailout package and forwarding the deepening of structural reforms, widespread 
societal consensus is required as these measures will be coming in a ‘tired’ socio-economic 
context that is difficult to provide consent to inefficient, unfair and unproductive measures such 
as the ones implemented in the last years. To that extent it is important that the country builds 
strong institutions that might provide the societal consensus that is detrimental for the 
sustainability of measures that are taken in order to deal with the crisis effectively, and perhaps 
avoid a future one. In modern democracies, abstract types of trust prevail and thus a challenge 
is at hand to identify the cognitive mobilization mechanisms that will be at work in this phase of 
a society’s overall development process (Newton, 1997). Fukuyama (2001; 2014) makes similar 
observations regarding the way in which quality institutions enhance trust in democratic 
procedures. He suggests that a society’s stock of trust can be destroyed by a state that is 
inefficient in the provision of necessary public goods, and particularly property rights, public 
safety, control of the state’s involvement in market activities (Fukuyama, 2001). Albeit a stable 
and mature constitutional democracy that sustains fair political rights and liberties to her citizens 
(Danopoulos, 2017) Greece faces a democratic quality and depth challenge.  Increasing 
abstention rates point to a legitimization crisis that most probably relates to the wider civic 
culture qualities of the Greek society (Bitros, 2013; Daskalopoulou, 2018a). In particular, rent 
seeking activities, government inefficiency and partisan politics have built change resistant 
barriers (Bitros, 2013). To that extent, it is important to verify that in the case of Greece, the 
voting decision seems to have a strong instrumental character. Income matters and citizens 
seem to move away from political institutions and turn to alternative forms of engagement either 
as a complement or a substitute to formal political participation. To that extent the future might 
bring about a combination of reactions/trends towards voting which will involve an increase in 
commitment to vote as the ultimate instrument of participation; a trend towards a more apolitical 
(pathetic) stance; and a trend towards alternative forms of civic engagement (non-standard, 
abstract forms of engagement). The current findings suggest that wider alternative political 
engagement/disengagement mechanisms are present in Greek society, and they merit attention 
and future research. The analysis of the potentially long run effects that the crisis’ measures 
and developments might have on citizens’ motivation to vote is an additional issue for future 
research in the field. 
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